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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Curtis Hollon appeals from his judgment of conviction and challenges the district court's
ruling that Mr. Hollon may not elicit expert testimony or argue to the jury regarding the
absorption of alcohol- the possibility that Mr. Hollon's Breath Alcohol Content ("BAC") rose
or fell between when he was driving to when he was tested, 46 minutes later. Mr. Hollon asserts
that the district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the applicable legal
standards, because the court's decision is incorrect in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 3 78 (2018), in which the Court abrogated State v.

Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2015).
Mr. Hollon also contends that the district court violated his right to due process by
unconstitutionally prohibiting his right to present a complete defense.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions- not that the district
court did not err, which the State conceded- that the district court' s error was: (1) unpreserved,
and (2) harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Hollon's Appellant's Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. Hollon's due process right to present a
defense when it prohibited him from eliciting testimony or arguing regarding a rising Breath
Alcohol Content?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Prohibited Testimony And Argument As To
Rising Breath Alcohol Content, Violating Mr. Hollon's Constitutional Right To Present A
Complete Defense
The State concedes that "the district court erred when it excluded all evidence of Hollon's
rising BAC." (Resp. Br., pp.9, 10.) The State makes a preservation argument by claiming that
Mr. Hollon failed to identify the substance of the evidence he sought to admit at trial. (Resp.
Br., pp.6-8.) In support of this claim, the State cites to I.R.E. 103 and Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker
Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 251 (2010), asserting that because Mr. Hollon did not make an

offer of proof, he failed to preserve the claim for appellate review.

(Resp. Br., pp.6-8.)

However, the State's claim is baseless, as the facts of Kuhn are distinguishable from
Mr. Hollon's case, and a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision has clarified the rule
regarding the preservation of excluded evidence.
In Kuhn, the appellant claimed that the district court erred by prohibiting the out-of-court
statements of Mr. Kuhn's ex-wife; however, the information before the district court was only
that the party sought admission of ''some of the things that Jackie Kuhn may have said or may
have not said . . ." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that this representation was not a
sufficient offer of proof for the Court to determine whether the statements would fall within the
party opponent exception to the hearsay rule, and it declined to address the merits of the issue.
Id.

Here, the State claims the district court apparently did not have enough information to
issue a ruling, despite the court actually ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. (Resp.
Br., pp.6-8.) However, the record reflects that there was no question amongst the parties and the
court as to what the substance of the testimony would have been. (Tr., p.242, L.23 - p.250, L.2.)
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The substance of Officer Wendler's disclosed testimony and Officer Arrington's knowledge of
rising BAC were discussed, at length, by the parties and the court.
For example, during cross-examination of Officer Arrington, defense counsel asked the
officer about the absorption of alcohol. (Tr., p.242, Ls.23-25.) The prosecutor objected and
asked the district court to preclude the defense from eliciting rising BAC testimony from the
witness. (Tr., p.243, Ls.1-25.) The prosecutor argued that Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of
Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012), stood for the proposition that, if the state can show that

the breathalyzer has been properly calibrated and is properly working, the defense cannot bring
up rising BAC. (Tr., p.243, Ls.18-25.) The defense reminded the court that the State disclosed a
summary of expected testimony of Officer Wendler, which included "the time that alcohol takes
to rise, peak, and decline. Alcohol concentration peaks, approximately, 30 minutes to an hour.
Alcohol metabolization," and a myriad of subjects. (Tr., p.245, Ls.4-15.) Defense counsel also
argued that the case law that had developed in this area was wrong. (Tr., p.245, Ls.8-9; p.246,
Ls.19-22.)
The district court ruled:
Well, as to that point initially, I have before me the summary of expected
testimony from January 8th. At that point, who knows what the strategy was but
as of today, the state's indicated they don't intend to go down door -- or open that
door any further.
So to the extent it was argued, they did so by simply filling a summary. That
request is overruled, and I would indicate that the door hasn't been opened. 1
1

This ruling that further foreclosed Mr. Hollon from putting on a defense is inconsistent with the
Idaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 61 l(a) provides that "[t]he court should exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence." I.R.E. 611 (b)
addresses the scope of cross-examination:
Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility. The court may allow
inquhy into additional matters as ifon direct examination.
4

I reviewed Tomlinson as well as Elias, E-1-i-a-s, Crews [sic] cited by the state.
I'm familiar with the cases. They both stand for the proposition that the
metabolism of alcohol -- frankly, what a person was when they were driving is
irrelevant to quote the Court in Tomlinson. 2
And I recognize, Mr. Dillman, that you take exception to those cases and their
holding, one from the Court of Appeals and one from the Supreme Court. But
nevertheless, those are the laws at this point in this state.
They have not been overruled. They've been affinned, apparently, by Judge
Kershaw in this district, though, I recognize that is not binding on me. But at the
same time I do, at this point, note that they haven't been overruled by the
appellate court, and so the holdings are binding.
I would sustain the objection on that basis noting your concerns as well. And,
certainly, if there is a need to look at those, this might be a prime case to have it
reviewed if there is a conviction here.
But for now, I will sustain the objection and direct you not to inquire about what
went on between the period of the time of the stop and the test. I don't think it's
relevant.
(Tr., p.248, Ls.16 - p.250, L.2.)
The district court clearly had enough infonnation on the defense's proposed testimony to
rule and to later direct, "neither party is to discuss during closings any notion of extrapolation or
the fact that it took 45 minutes between the stop and the test affecting the number at all."
(Tr., p.314, Ls.20-24.)
Since Kuhn, Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that an offer of proof is not mandatory, so
long as a record is made for appeal, and the trial court is able to rule on the admissibility of the
proffered evidence. See Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 289 (2012) (holding that the record
contained the infonnation excluded by the magistrate court and thus an offer of proof was not
required).

I.R.E. 611 (emphasis added); Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642,649 (201 I). The admission of
expert testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho
873, 875 ( 1995).
2
State v. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2015).
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In Clair, the Idaho Supreme Court explained the reason for the Rule:
Here, there is a sufficient record for appeal although Tracy failed to provide an
offer of proof regarding what Dr. Vereen's opinions on a custodial split would
have been. In Young, this Court ruled that an issue regarding the relevance of
excluded evidence was not preserved for appeal because of the absence of an
offer of proof"or anything in the record showing" relevance. 136 Idaho at 120,
29 P.3d at 956. 3 Here, there is something in the record that shows exactly what
had been excluded and that the magistrate court understood what it was
excluding. Thus, we find that there is a sufficient record to review the merits of
this issue.
Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 289-90 (2012) (emphasis added.) Like Clair, in Mr. Hollon's
case, the district court had ample evidence that the proposed testimony would be regarding a
rising BAC, and the court heard the arguments of the parties on the pertinent case law. The
State's claims that the district court did not have ample information in order for it to rule on the
admissibility of the proffered evidence, or that there is an insufficient record for appeal, are
without merit.
The State likens the facts of this case to those in Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 923
(2004). (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The Slack Court held that there was no evidence or testimony in the
appellate record indicating that the medical expert would testify that Slack's life expectancy
would be shortened by her medical conditions. Id. However, in Slack, neither the expert witness
disclosures nor the expert report were in the record on appeal. Id. Here, the expert witness
disclosure was in the record, and it included the substance of the expected testimony, "The
length of time it takes for alcohol to rise, peak and decline in a person's body, and that alcohol
concentration peaks approximately 30 minutes to l hour after alcohol consumption stops."
{R., p.45.) On appeal, Mr. Hollon challenged the district court's ruling that he may not elicit

expert testimony or argue to the jury regarding the absorption of alcohol- the possibility that
Mr. Hollon's Breath Alcohol Content ("BAC") rose or fell between when he was driving to
3

State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113 (2001).
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when he was tested, 46 minutes later. (App. Br., pp.7-12.) In this case, the substance of the
proposed testimony was clear.
The State concedes that "the district court erred when it excluded all evidence of Hollon's
rising BAC," but claims any error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9, 10.) The State claims the
error is harmless because the only evidence regarding the number of drinks consumed by
Mr. Hollon was his initial statement to the arresting office- that he had a beer and a shot of
Fireball two hours before he was stopped. (Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) The State claims that, at the
conclusion of trial, the record contained no rising BAC evidence and thus the district court's
ruling was harmless because the rising BAC defense was not available to Mr. Hollon. (Resp.
Br., pp.10-12.)
However, during the State's case in chief, the defense had been instructed "not to inquire
about what went on between the period of the time of the stop and the test. I don't think it's
relevant." (Tr., p.249, L.19 - p.250, L.2.) It would have been violative of the district court's
order for the defense to call Mr. Hollon to the stand to elicit testimony as to the period of time
between when he had the two drinks to when he drove. The district court's ruling prevented the
defense from presenting any rising BAC evidence or argument. Like in State v. Austin, 163
Idaho 378 (2018) (abrogating Tomlinson as erroneously extending the irrelevancy of a driver's
actual alcohol concentration while driving to deny a defendant's right to present contrary
evidence in his defense), this Court should find the district court's error was not harmless. Id. at
382. In Austin, the State charged the defendant alternatively under both DUI theories, and the
court provided jury instructions on both theories of guilt. Id. The Austin Court held "There is no
indication of which theory the jury convicted him. The inability to present an available defense
to the per se violation in this case was not harmless." Id. at 382.
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Like the facts in Austin, the district court prevented Mr. Hollon from presenting an
available defense to the per se violation, and the jury was instructed on alternate theories of guilt.
(R., p.134.) Also like Austin, there is no indication of the theory by which the jury convicted
him. (R., p.143.) The error is not harmless.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hollon respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court's order sustaining the State's objection, and order a new trial wherein
the district court will properly admit testimony, evidence, and argument regarding his alcohol
concentration when he was driving.
DATED this l51 day of October, 2019.

Isl Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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